In U.S. presidential elections, voters in noncompetitive states seem not to countand so have zero voting power, according to the Banzhaf and other voting-power indices-because they cannot influence the outcome in their states. But because the electoral votes of these states are essential to a candidate's victory, it seems that they do count, but in a different way.
Introduction
The role of the Electoral College in U.S. presidential elections has been controversial since the Constitution was adopted in 1789. It became more so starting in the 1830s, when states began to require that all their electoral votes be cast for the plurality-vote winner in their state, which is true today in all states except Maine and Nebraska. The controversy was exacerbated by the 2000 election, when, for the third time-the two previous instances were in 1876 and 1888-the popular-vote winner (Al Gore) was not the electoral-vote winner (George Bush). 1 The winner-take-all rule in states has not only produced divided verdicts, like that in 2000, but it also has had a profound effect on how candidates campaign in presidential elections. Especially in recent elections, candidates have spent almost all their campaign resources in the competitive states, which have the tightest races, based on state polls, and in which a candidate's expenditures can make a difference between victory and defeat in these states.
In 2012, there was a consensus among pollsters and analysts that nine states were "up for grabs," based on their state polls, though in the actual election Mitt Romney won only one of these states (North Carolina). 2 Before the election, it was believed that none 1 In 1824, there was no majority electoral-vote winner, so the election was decided in the House of Representatives. However, the popular-vote winner was uncertain, because electors in six states were legislatively appointed rather than popularly elected, so one cannot determine who the popular-vote winner was (Andrew Jackson received a plurality of electoral votes but lost the election to John Quincy Adams in the House). 2 A tenth state, Pennsylvania, received some attention from both candidates, but only at the end of the campaign. In fact, the margin of victory that Pennsylvania gave Obama (5.39%) was slightly less than the margin he received in two other states-New Hampshire (5.58%) and Iowa (5.81%)-so in retrospect it probably should have been included among the competitive states.
of the other 41 states or the District of Columbia could be wrested from the candidate who was clearly ahead in the polls.
Effectively, then, the voters in the noncompetitive states did not count-under no circumstances could they, as individuals, influence the outcomes in their states and, therefore, their states in the Electoral College. Consequently, they had zero voting power, as measured, for example, by the relative Banzhaf index, to which we will return later.
But noncompetitive states do influence the outcome, because their electoral votes are essential to a candidate's victory. We resolve the paradox of how a noncompetitive state can influence the outcome, even though its voters have no voting power, by showing how the distribution of electoral votes in the noncompetitive states sets up the contest in the competitive states.
More specifically, the nine states that were believed competitive in 2012 collectively had 110 of the 538 electoral votes. But because Barack Obama had a 237-191 electoral-vote lead over Mitt Romney in the 41 noncompetitive states and the District of Columbia, he needed only 33 of the 110 electoral votes in the competitive states to win with a majority of 270 electoral votes, whereas Romney needed 79. As we will show, there were 5.5 more ways that Obama could win a majority of electoral votes than could Romney.
Additionally, in 251 of Obama's 431 winning coalitions (58.2%), no competitive state-even the largest, Florida-could change the outcome by changing its vote, whereas in 75 of Romney's 76 winning coalitions (98.7%), at least one state's defection could rob him of victory, making Romney's winning coalitions much more vulnerable.
We measure the vulnerability of a candidate's winning and tied coalitions by the proportion of them in which a single competitive state, by switching to the other candidate, can change the winner to the other candidate or create a tie. Their fragility is measured by the expected number of states it takes to change the outcome in winning and tied coalitions.
By these measures, Romney's winning coalitions were 2.4 times more vulnerable, and 5.5 times more fragile, than Obama's, which is attributable to the lead that Obama enjoyed in the noncompetitive states. In sum, the noncompetitive states count, but they exercise power in a different way from the competitive states.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we give a hypothetical 5-state example, in which there are 2 5 = 32 possible splits of the 5 states (each state may vote for one of the other of the two major-party candidates). It illustrates the advantages that the leading candidate receives-in opportunities to win and in diminished vulnerability and fragility-when he or she needs fewer electoral votes from the competitive states to win.
We compare these results with those in which each candidate needs exactly the same number of electoral votes-a simple majority-to win. We then make these calculations for the nine competitive states in 2012, for which it is not feasible to list the 2 9 = 512 possible splits.
In section 3, we calculate the relative The difference in winningness of X and Y when ties are not possible is
which equals 62.5% when N = 6. This is the percentage gap in the ability of X vs. Y to win in our 5-state example.
Viewed another way, because X wins in 26 splits and Y in 6, X has 26/6 = 4 1/3 times more opportunities to win in our model, in which all states vote independently for each candidate with probability ½, so all possible splits are equiprobable. As we pointed out earlier, however, this does not imply that every voter votes, with equal probability, for one or the other candidate. In the aggregate, however, every state, because it is competitive, is a priori equally likely to cast its electoral votes for either candidate.
There are significant differences between X and Y's winning coalitions. Define a candidate's vulnerability index, V(N), to be the conditional probability, given that the candidate needs at least N electoral votes to win, that his or her winning coalition includes at least one critical state. Table 1 Multiplying the number of each candidate's winning coalitions by the number of states that make it vulnerable, and dividing this result by the number of winning coalitions of each candidate, we obtain from Table 1 
It is no accident that the ratio of X's winningness to Y's, and Y's fragility to X's,
are equal, In sum, our three indices measure the strength of a candidate in different ways,
where "strength" is increasing in W(N) and decreasing in V(N) and F(N). As useful as they are, however, these indices do not measure the power of the noncompetitive states, compared with the competitive states, in deciding an election.
For this purpose, we show in Table 2 the 16 splits in which each candidate wins with at least 11 electoral votes, or ties with 10, of the 20 electoral votes (we assume in Table 2 the winning candidate to be X.) We call this situation, which assumes that the noncompetitive states split their electoral votes evenly so it takes a simple majority of electoral votes in the competitive states to win, the baseline. We will compare the index values we just computed, in which X needs 6 and Y needs 15 electoral votes to win, with their baseline values.
Table 2 about here
In two of the 17 splits in Table 2 (#7 and #16), there is no winner because there is a 10-10 tie between X and Y. In this split, all 5 states are critical, because if one state defects from either X or Y, it causes its tied coalition to lose.
We count a critical defection of a state from a tied coalition of X (#7 and #16 in Table 2 ) as ½ of a defection from a winning coalition, based on the assumption that it is equally likely that this defection will be from the other tied coalition and, therefore, not cause one's tied coalition to lose. By the same token, if a state's defection causes a winning coalition to tie with the other coalition (as is possible in splits #4, #6, #8, #10, and #13), it also counts as ½ a defection, because it does not cause the winning coalition to become losing but instead prevents it from winning.
In sum, either making or breaking a tie through a defection has 50% of the value of defection from a winning coalition that causes it to lose. Using the formulas given previously for winningness, vulnerability, and fragility, the baselines values when X and Y need at least 11 electoral votes to win are as follows:
In Table 3 , we pull together the index values of winningness, vulnerability, and fragility-including the differences in these values and their ratios when N = 6 and N = 15-and show their percent changes from the baseline figures given above. In the case of winningness, the change for both X and Y from the baseline figure of 50% is 31.25/50 = 62.5%, which is up for X and down for Y. Table 3 
about here
The baseline figure for vulnerability is 78.1%, where the shift down for X to 50% is 28.1/78.1 ≈ 36.0%, and the shift up to 100% for Y is 21.9/78.1 ≈ 28.0%. The baseline figure for fragility is 1.69, and the shift down for X to 0.69 is 1/1.69 ≈ 59.2%, and the shift up for Y to 3 is 1.31/1.69 ≈ 77.5%.
To summarize, five of the six of the changes from the baselines, which are shown in parentheses in Table 3 , are greater or equal to 50%, with only the decrease in the vulnerability of X less (36.0%). These shifts from the baselines, ranging from 36.0% to 77.5%, indicate that X's lead in the noncompetitive states has a significant and sometimes dramatic effect on the candidates' political strength. Tables 1 and 2, we give in Table 4 only the summary statistics we did for the 5-state example in Table 3 .
Winningness favors Obama over Romney by 69.4% and a ratio of 5.5. As for vulnerability and fragility, Romney's winning and tied coalitions are 2.4 times more vulnerable, and 5.5 times more fragile (same as the winningness ratio), than Obama's.
The candidates' baseline values on our three indices, whereby each candidate needs 56 of the 110 electoral votes in the 9 competitive states to win, are as follows: John F. Banzhaf III proposed an index of voting power in Banzhaf (1965) , which he later applied to the Electoral College (Banzhaf, 1968 
As before, we assume all competitive states vote independently and are equally likely to support Obama or Romney in the 2012 election, rendering equiprobable all 512 splits of these states in which one candidate or the other wins or ties. Equivalently, B(J)
can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen critical defection is cast by state J when all critical defections are assumed to be equiprobable.
7 The Banzhaf index, and a related index due to Johnston (1978) , have been applied to members of other federal institutions, including the President, Representatives, and Senators (Brams, Affuso, and Kilgour, 1989) . Different voting-power indices, such as the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index, are analyzed and compared in Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Holler and Nurmi (2013) . These indices have been applied to many voting bodies, as well as other institutions connected by a set of rules, including, for example, the European Union Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (Cichocki and Zyczkwoski, 2010). 8 The absolute Banzhaf index of state J is the number of its critical defections-the numerator of the right side of B(J)-divided by the total number of coalitions that include J, which is 2 n-1 because half of all coalitions include J. This index gives the unconditional probability that J will be critical, whereas the relative Banzhaf index normalizes the absolute Banzhaf index, so the voting power of all states sums to 1.
We next consider how voting power is affected when the voters, rather than the states, are considered to be the players. The Banzhaf power of a voter in competitive state J measures the relative degree to which he or she can influence the outcome in a presidential election via the outcome in state J, and the state, in turn, in the Electoral College.
Assume partisan voters in each competitive state split 50-50, and independent voters are equally likely to support Obama or Romney, and so, by extension, is the state. Banzhaf (1968) showed that if the number of voters in a state is sufficiently large, the relative power of each voter in competitive state J scales according to 1/ n J , where n J is the number of voters in J. 9 The relative Banzhaf index of an individual voter in J, compared with an individual voter in other competitive states, is
Like the B(J)'s, the β (J)'s sum to 1. Even the smallest state, Wyoming, which has a population of less than one million, is more than large enough to make the scaling factor, 1/ n J , an accurate measure of the ability of an individual voter in Wyoming, compared with voters in different-size states, to be critical. True, the population of each state is not a precise reflection of the number of its citizens who actually voted in 2012, but for purposes of measuring the relative power of citizens in different states, it is a good approximation.
We start by calculating B(J) in our 5-state example, wherein the states are assumed to be the players and have the same numbers of voters (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) as electoral votes (see Table 5 ), which is too few to invoke the inverse square root law. 10 These calculations can be made directly from Tables 1 and 2 when X and Y need (i) different numbers (6 for X, and 15 for Y)
(ii) the same number (11 for both candidates) of the 20 electoral votes to win. putting the candidates on a par in the competitive states, one increases the vulnerability of winning coalitions and the criticality of states in them.
The power values of the 5 states are quite close, if not identical, in the two cases.
Only the power of states C and D differ in cases (i) and (ii); for the other three states, the power values are the same. In fact, the values in the smallest (A) and largest (E) states are not only identical but also proportional to the electoral votes of the states: E has thrice the weight (i.e., numbers of voters), and thrice the voting power, of A. (ii) same number (56 for both candidates) of the 110 electoral votes to win. As in the 5-state example, there are more winning and tied coalitions (512) that are vulnerable (404) in case (ii) than in case (i) (255), and there are also more critical defections in case (ii) (1,032) than in case (i) (404). Once again, leveling the playing field increases the vulnerability of winning coalitions and the criticality of states in them. Table 6 As shown in the bottom half of In sum, Romney desperately needed to win Florida, whereas Obama could afford to lose it, in that 81.7% of Obama's winning coalitions did not include it. Nevertheless, both candidates devoted substantially more resources to Florida than any other competitive state. In the election itself, Florida turned out to be the state with the closest winning margin (Obama won by 0.88%).
The nine competitive states plus Pennsylvania had the ten closest margins in the country, indicating in retrospect that the candidates knew well where to spend their campaign resources to greatest advantage. Unfortunately for Mitt Romney, the cards 11 If the largest state, California, were competitive, the voting power of its voters since the 1960s has exceeded that of voters in the smallest states by more than 3:1 (Banzhaf, 1968; Owen, 1975; Miller, 2013) . A 2-person noncooperative game-theoretic model of optimal resource allocation under the Electoral College also shows that if California were a competitive state, its attractiveness per voter would exceed that of the smallest states also by more than 3:1, based on the "3/2's rule" Davis, 1973, 1974) .
were stacked against him in the noncompetitive states and, it turned out, the competitive states as well.
Conclusions
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the noncompetitive states in a U.S. presidential election do count, but in a different way from the competitive states. True, the majorparty candidates target, almost exclusively, voters in competitive states, because it is these states that determine the outcome in most presidential elections. 
